congratulation line, an essay called "Serious Reflections on The Rise ofthe Novell Titles beginning with "towards" always make me wonder "Why doesn't he wait till he arrives? Then he'll know if there is anything there worth reporting." In any case, you will not expect any report from me on that vast abstraction, the "Poetics of Fiction." For the "flat-footed" pedestrian of my title is, of course, myself; and I continue to totter along the "flyblown" paths of "realism." I thought that one reasonably decorous way of fulfilling my assignment would be to avoid tracks I've made already, or that have been much noted by others, and give a biographical account of how some of the less obviously pedestrian elements in The Rise of the Novel came into being, mainly through the influence of that least earthbound of all modes of thought, the German intellectual tradition. I will then, still remaining abroad, look briefly at how the various foreign translations and the subsequent receptions of what I normally think of as the R ofN drew attention to some of its larger and less-noticed ideological implications. Finally there may be a stopover in Paris, before coming home to speak my mind about the representational status of fiction and, more emphatically, about the need for realism in literary criticism.
The Three Periods of Composition: Thesis
Looking back on the process of composition of the R of N, I have been delighted to discover a truly Hegelian pattern of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis.
The registered topic of my PhD dissertation in 1 938 was "The Novel and Its Reader: 1719-1754." The title reflects something of the intellectual atmosphere of Cambridge in the late 1930s. There was logical positivism. Some of my friends spent a good deal of time waiting for someone to use the word "why" so that they could jump in with "But you mustn't say that. The only real questions are how questions." My research topic wholly disregarded the "why," assumed the more or less publicly attested phenomenon of the "rise of the novel," and attempted to study merely the "how." Behind my approach there lay the deep-rooted empiricism and moralism of the English-and especially the Cambridge-tradition. In particular, there was the reader criticism of LA. Richards's Practical Criticism (1929) , certainly the most influential text as far as the Cambridge English school was 4 Ian Watt, "Serious Reflections on The Rise ofthe Novel" Novel: A Forum on Fiction 1 ( 1 968), 205-18; reprinted, Towards a Poetics of Fiction: Essaysfrom "Novel: A Forum on Fiction " 1967 -1976 , ed. Mark Spilka (Bloomington and London: Indiana University Press, 1977 concerned: and, no less important, there was also the combination of the historical and moral outlook of the Leavises: ER. Leavis had done a historical thesis on the cultural milieu of Addison; and Q.D. Leavis had published her thesis, Fiction and the Reading Public, in 1 932. Its dominating assumption was that in the past there had been a long golden age in which the relation of author and audience was harmonious and fruitful; but then industrialism, the mass media, Philistine commercialism, and metropolitan decadence had produced the situation of "mass civilisation and minority civilisation," which only Cambridge and Scrutiny were attempting to stand against. The other main influence on my thinking in 1938 was the Marxist;
and its influence was in many ways surprisingly complementary to the others. The materialist outlook of Marxism made it consonant with a great deal of the empirical and positivist tradition in scholarship; and because it related literature to society, and viewed the current cultural situation as one of catastrophic decline, there was substantial agreement between the Communist critical position and that of the Leavises. This is very clear in the work of my friend and contemporary, Arnold Kettle. His valuable Introduction to the English Novel (1951), for instance, reveals a mixture of Leavisite and Marxist orientations which now seems strikingly anomalous. Antithesis: 1946 Antithesis: -1948 My own subject was an awkward exception as far as both the Leavises and the Marxists were concerned, since the novel was fairly obviously a literary form that had not got worse as we approached the present. But at the time-1939-I was little troubled by such difficulties; there were obviously much more serious troubles ahead. The war came in September. When it terminated, and I was demobilized seven years later in the spring of 1 946, 1 found myself with no very definite ideas about what to do next. As a prisoner for three and a half years, I had accrued most of that pay and over half a year's leave and, in so far as I thought seriously of what I would do when that was finished, the most definite idea I can now recall was that of going into the wine business. But I was destined to be saved for a worse fate than wealth and cirrhosis of the liver. I remember going one day to the British Museum, without any clear purpose, and looking through the catalogues to see what had happened during my long absence; and the dating on my notes makes it clear that, by some piece of luck I cannot now explain, I apparently made my painful way in the next couple of months through Georg Lukács's Die Theorie des Romans (1920) lively group of faculty and students; but the most significant single result of this detour into the social sciences was to bring me into touch with someone who was certainly to be more responsible than any other single person for the intellectual shaping of The Rise of the Novel, and for the long delay in its completion, the late Theodor Adorno, now well known as a leader of the Frankfurt School, which was then located in the area round the Pacific Palisades. We had hardly met when he said with genuine interest that he would be glad to read my mansuscript. When I returned to his house a few days later, he kept me on the doorstep explaining his view of the difficulties involved in using the term "genius"; he then modulated into how he never used the word lightly; and finally, well, modesty forbids that I go on, but the word of praise he used convinced me that he had connected me with the wrong manuscript. Later I got to know Adorno fairly well, and this caused me three kinds of delay. First, I didn't want to be found out, so that for some time it became virtually impossible for me to write anything at all; second, I became aware that, given his intimidatingly large view of what any educated man had at his fingertips, I still had an awfully long way to go; and third, I came to understand that what he most liked in my dissertation were in fact independent parallels or extensions of some of the general ideas of the Frankfurt School, notably of some of the ideas expressed in a work which appeared in that year, The Dialectic of Enlightenment (1947) . The discussion there of the "cunning of technocratic reason" has some parallels with parts of The Rise of the Novel: what I had said about Robinson Crusoe; what I suggested about the potentialities of mass exploitation contained in the closer identification between the literary work and the reader which was made possible by the printing press and by what I already called "formal realism"; and more widely, what I said about the larger connections between the city and bourgeois privatization in the chapter on "Print and Private Experince."
Adorno was an immensely generous and fertile person; there was a purity, almost a childlike innocence, in his enthusiasm for the life of the mind; he put me in touch with the whole tradition of German thought in history, literature, sociology, and psychology; and he did it in the only way it could have been done for me, because I would never have believed that people actually thought like that until I saw Adorno continually doing it.
His most immediate effect on the R of N was to make me put aside the manuscript until such time as I should feel new wings sprouting; and meanwhile I began quite another book, which dealt, broadly speaking, with literacy, reading, memory, and technology in the widest possible theoret- should be in the future, but as something which exists, and which manifests its own living, though stress-ridden and ever-changing, equilibrium of institutional and cultural forces. This mode of thought made me very aware of the dubiousness of many of the unchallenged assumptions I had more or less unconsciously picked up from all kinds of sources-Plato, Matthew Arnold, Leavis, Marxism, and the Frankfurt School, for instance. I did not, of course, stifle all my personal impulses of social criticism or disgust, but I became much more aware of them; one result, I think, was to give a greater degree of objectivity to the sociological and historical aspects of The Rise of the Novel.
A related impulse-towards a more immediate and direct sympathetic penetration of the authors I was studying, and a greater awareness of the activities of my own consciousness in the process-was strengthened by another lucky meeting. Aron Gurwitsch, then teaching mathematics at a small local college, though already editing the Journal of Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, introduced me to the thought of Brentano, Husserl, and Merleau-Ponty. What remains most vividly is the tonic vitality of his sardonic contempt for most of the subjects which came up in conversation; but I think I also picked up some ways of going beyond positivism in my treatment of intention, quotidian expectation, and imaginative projection. Synthesis: 1950 Synthesis: -1956 Back in Cambridge, England, in 1948, the difficulties in finishing the book on literacy, and the not obscurely related one of earning some kind of living, finally impelled me back to the tattered manuscript on the eighteenthcentury novel. It was used first as a quarry for isolated articles. The first was "The Naming of Characters in Defoe, Richardson and Fielding" (1949) ; its traces of phenomenology may explain why it has found its only reprint in Germany. The second article, on "Robinson Crusoe as a Myth" (1951), was so influenced by Adorno, and more directly by Weber and Stamm, that one American reviewer, perhaps disturbed by my departure from the then established tendency to see the eighteenth century wholly in eighteenthcentury terms, seems to have assumed I must be German. (The next two, one on a mistaken Defoe attribution, and the other on the views of Defoe and Richardson about Homer, reveal fairly directly the diverse influences of positivism and of Georg Lukács.) When I started working on the manuscript as a whole, I became aware that my present understanding of the subject, and even more my now initiated sense of what a full understanding might be, was leading me towards a much more ambitious enterprise than I had originally conceived, and one which would be even more impossibly long.
How could I combine all the data I had amassed with the ideas I now thought informed them with larger meaning? My resolution of the problem was Draconian, both as regards substance and form. As regards substance, I expressed my larger philosophical or historical ideas only where they seemed directly relevant to the matter at hand, and usually only where there was sufficient evidence to illustrate them from the primary sources. On the other hand, I drastically reduced the empirical data, and left little that did not illuminate the larger intellectual perspectives. As to my rhetorical strategy, it was primarily literary, in the sense that I wished to avoid anything that might be indigestible, whether in the way of too much flat empirical documentation, or in the way of sesquipedalian philosophical abstraction.
In a sense, my general method reversed that of Adorno. In the foreword to the English edition of Prisms, Adorno pays homage to what "the author has learned from Anglo-Saxon norms of thought and presentation." But it turns out this is purely "as a control, lest he reject common sense without first having mastered it"; and then Adorno paradoxically concludes that "it is only by the use of its own categories, that common sense can be transcended."6 In a way, Adorno helped me go beyond common sense; but my main aim can be stated in terms of the opposite paradox: to transcend what I had learned from the idealist modes of German thought by translating it into empirical categories and common sense It would take me much too long to illustrate this synthesis; and it would also involve my rereading the book. But looking at the first paragraph I notice a certain prefigurative indication of this union of the empirical and the non-empirical; the paragraph proceeds from a how question to a why question: from "how does [eighteenth-century prose fiction] differ from [that] of the past" to "is there any reason why these differences appeared when and where they did" (p. 9).
That The Rise of the Novel benefited from these various philosophical presences, even though they were at most briefly mentioned in footnotes or the preface, seems to me quite certain; it probably accounts, among other things, for the increasing interest in the book in the last few years; I surmise the basis for its virtually posthumous topicality must in part be that its substance and its emphases were much more in touch with a wide spectrum of the modern ideology than appeared on the surface. This, I think, can be verified by the pattern of its reception.
European Translations and Reactions
The first two translations appeared in 1974: into German, as Der Bürgerliche Roman, and into Polish as Narodziny Powiesci (the birth of the romance/novel). These two titles were not, I think, mistranslations. The mere absence-not only in German and Polish but in many other languages-of the distinction which is established in English between romance and novel made a literal translation of The Rise of the Novel impossible. To call it, instead, "The Bourgeois Romance" was to draw primary attention to the historico-social aspect of the book in a Marxist way; and the same emphasis occurs in the Italian translation-Le Origini del Romanzo Borghese (1976) . It contains a long essay by the translator, Luigi del Grosso Destreri, "Bourgeois Culture and Popular Culture." Destreri laments that the "so-called sociologists of literature" have not "seriously meditated" on "il Watt," partly because of the book's "logical positivist positions"; he then proposes a "second birth" for the book by making it an occasion for a "larger discussion of the conditions of production of cultural models."
The essay is an interesting one, but I have time to discuss only one issue, which is minor in itself but illustrates both the advantages and disadvantages of my empirical method of composition. Destreri reproves me for "having described but failed to name" the phenomena of alienation and anomie, but he praises me for "having placed himself unknowingly in the critical tradition of Lukács and Lucien Goldmann." In fact, I had not, in the 1950s, heard of Goldmann, although he in turn reflected the ideas of some of the Frankfurt figures whose work I knew, such as Franz Borkenau, Walter Benjamin, and Bernard Groethuysen; as to Lukács, I had read, and to some extent accepted, some of his ideas, both Hegelian and Marxist. But I could hardly have made either my debts or my disagreement with Lukács or the Frankfurt School explicit in The Rise of the Novel without intruding large conceptual issues which would have diverted my attention, and that of my readers, from the concrete immediacies of my subject. It was for similar reasons that I had even avoided using the word "bourgeois" (except when quoting). Just as the word "alienation," whether used by Hegel, Marx, or later thinkers, implies an anterior state of spiritual, economic, and cultural harmony whose actual historical existence I question, so Marx's sense of "bourgeoisie" implies a whole historical and political theory. I used various concrete aspects of that theory, but avoided the term itself because it invoked metaphysical ideas which I rejected. On the other hand, I did not mention my disagreement, if only because I had no reason to believe that my arguments for it would be particularly interesting to other people, since they had long ceased to be interesting to me.
This abstention from ideological topicality had the sufficient advantage for me of sharpening my focus on the subject at hand; but I have reason to believe that it did not in the event decrease the topicality of what I did say. I know, from articles, conversations, and letters, that readers of The Rise of the Novel in Poland, Hungary, and Romania, for instance, have found in it a topical relevance, even a minor controversial interest, which was certainly quite unintended; and this topicality is directly concerned with the very issues that had led me to avoid using the terms "bourgeois," "alienation," and "anomie." The issue, very simply put, is whether bourgeois values, and the whole range of disaffections from society denoted by the terms "alienation" and "anomie," are, as Marx and Durkheim assumed, the temporary result of a particular phase in the development of capitalist production. For the writers in socialist countries, the question-which is diametrically opposed to the assumptions of their prevalent "socialist realism"-is whether the social, spiritual, and literary manifestations of alienated individualism may not in fact have very little to do with who owns the means of production. May it not, rather, be part of the evolutionary process of change from small tribal societies to those of the modern large-scale industrial and urban way of life? May not the whole cycle of what used to be dubbed "bourgeois individualism"-and the kind of novel associated with it-be a necessary historical stage in the literary and intellectual development of all developed industrial societies? Some Aspects of the Term "Realism" I come at last somewhat closer to the topic suggested by my title. If I have to wear a critical label, I have no particular objection to that of "sociological realist" recently pinned on me by Mark Spilka,7 although my basic reaction is a yawn followed by a plea of nolo contendere. My impatience is not so much with the general assumption that "realism" is a pedestrian and flatfooted metaphysical posture, as that in critical usage the term denotes controversies which, after a century or so, have become distinctly flyblown. But I think it may be worth while attempting to take up two general aspects of the problem in which the issues of realism are involved. First, a few words on the underlying meaning of the two terms I used, "realism of presentation" and "realism of assessment," in relation to the philosophical ideas which provided the second, or antithesis, stage of the gestation of The Rise of the Novel.
Realism of Presentation
In The Rise of the Novel, "realism of presentation" or "formal realism" was a way of differentiating the purely technical aspect of the narrative representation of the real world from the truth or otherwise of the substance of the literary work. I notice that three recent works on realism make a similar distinction. Thus Ernst Fischer, in The Necessity of Art (1967), speaks of one aspect of realism as "a particular method" of the novels and plays of the nineteenth century. Damián Grant uses the category "conscious realism"; and in his acute study, On Realism (1 973), J. Peter Stern describes realism in literature as "a way of depicting, describing a situation in a faithful, accurate, 'life-like' manner," and sees the special quality of "fiction in the nineteenth century" as containing "more realistic elements than earlier literature had done."8 In The Rise of the Novel, I had been dealing with the prehistory of that process; and what advance, if any, I made over previous treatments was to connect formal or presentational realism with two different kinds of causes, kinds which of their nature exposed them very unequally to the vicissitudes of history.
There were, first of all, the causes which I attributed to philosophical, social, economic, and educational changes affecting both authors and audience, changes which led to an emphasis on the individual, on the particular in time and space, on the material universe, and on quotidian life: all these and other historical factors had created a substantially new version of literature's ancient concern with verisimilitude; but since some of these changes were essentially social, I assumed that not only the particular content of eighteenth-century fiction but also some aspects of its distinguishing expressive idiom were not likely to outlive their period. But there were other kinds of cause which were much less subject to historical contingency: first, the authority of the pseudo-realism of print, which I attributed to the technological medium; and second, the associated establishment of silent and private reading as the novel's characteristic mode of performance. These factors, I assumed, derived from the mode of literary production itself, and had therefore contributed permanent qualitative changes in the expressive idiom of fiction; the objective and yet private effect of the printed page made possible a kind of realistic presentation which was likely to endure much longer.
My treatment of formal realism, then, was intended to be quite independent of the kind of consideration involved in using the term realism for a specific literary school of novelists; even less was I concerned with realism as a conscious critical doctrine which allegedly professes that fiction is or should be a photographic verbal reproduction of reality, or a direct, unmediated imitation of life.
The semantic difficulty with realism here seems to be insuperable, largely because we are all-and equally-experts on "reality," and therefore feel authorized to handle its terminology in whatever way we like. As a result the present debate, or rather non-debate, about realism is essentially a form of shadow-boxing in which no blows are ever landed because the ring of reality is so large: in fact there are no ropes. The overwhelming defacto victory of the anti-realists in the current critical arena depends upon two simple assumptions: that since there was a French literary school in the middle of the nineteenth century which used the term "réalisme,"
and since this label has also been extended to the whole course of fiction since Balzac and Stendhal to Zola and the good Dean Howells, realism in all guises must therefore be non-modern, and is therefore finished. When the anti-realist critic goes beyond this implicitly historical use of the term, the analytic model of realism remains the naive photographic reproduction of reality. Albert Guérard, for instance, in his fine recent book The Triumph of the Novel (1977), categorizes Dickens, Dostoevsky, and Faulkner as "non-realists" because they are patently not pretending to be mirrors or cameras of the ordinary world. Whatever Stendhal or indeed Hamlet or others may occasionally have said, no writer has ever seriously thought that he was just a mirror; but the assumption that realism can only mean the photographic imitation of the outside world affords critics too easy a target to be let die. In any case, my concept of formal or presentational realism was not intended to imply any restriction on its use; the detailed particularity of its representation of the inner or the outer world can be just as easily applied to melodrama, play, fantasy, involution, or what Guérard calls "illuminating distortion." The technical possibilities of presentational realism are in themselves quite neutral; they can serve any number of purposes:
and I notice that the three novelists with whom Guérard deals are in fact notable examples of many fictional techniques whose prehistory and analytic basis I was concerned with in The Rise of the Novel. All three of them, for instance, to take one obvious example, combine an almost obsessive concern with the physical objects and aspects of the environment with an equal concern to show that the individual's inner life is largely separate and autonomous-a point which is made in different ways by what I say about Robinson Crusoe and Pamela, but which could hardly be made without the way the illusion of print can make the inner and the outer world seem equally "real."
Realism ofAssessment
In The Rise of the Novel I attempted to establish another category of a very different kind, realism of assessment, which would take account of all the various ways in which the novel, like all literary forms, contains structuring elements other than those of representational intent. Later writers on realism have used similar terms. Ernst Fischer speaks of "realism of attitude" (Realismus der Haltung), Damián Grant of "conscious" or "conscientious" realism, and Peter Stern differentiates "descriptive" from "evaluative" realism.9 All three of these distinctions take account of the fact that the author's intellectual, emotional, and aesthetic predispositions are inevitably present, at various levels of consciousness, in all prose fiction as well as in any other genre of writing; and these predispositions can go from the simplest preferences in the writer's hierarchy of attention (Ann Radcliffe uses larches rather than magnolias, say) to much larger sets of organizing principles and values. Thus Lukács's admiration for the realists-from Scott and Balzac to Tolstoy-and his rejection of the naturalists are based upon his own philosophical, political, and aesthetic values, which lead him to reject any mechanical, conformist, or passive attitude to the material and social world.
The conception of realism of assessment was intended, at the higher levels of abstraction, to include not only such distinctions but others, from the phenomenological insistence on the structuring activity of the consciousness (Jean Starobinski, "conscience structurante") to the ultimate questions of the wisdom and truth of a literary work.
I am properly ashamed to thus affront your sophistication with such flyblown terms as wisdom and truth; but they are-and not very obscurelypart of my overt concern in The Rise of the Novel; and I would like to end by considering what I take to be a much more serious problem than the current critical objections to realism in fiction: the problem of how and why the dominant contemporary trends in literary criticism have tended to deny or neglect the truth status of literature, and to regard realism of 9 Fischer, Grant, chaps 2, 3; Stern, chaps 2, 8. critical assessment as an appropriate concern only for pedagogues with fallen arches.
Philosophy, Realism, and Literary Criticism: Realism and Structuralism It is, I think, very easy to see why the term "realism" arouses no excitement in philosophical circles. Apart from many specialized historical usages which need not concern us here, it denotes, very simply, the acceptance of three general notions: that the world and the people outside us are real; that language enables us to communicate about them to others; and that truth about them is verified through the assent of other observers. In what, as far as our practical dealings are concerned, we all know to be the real world, these notions raise no particular difficulty. I do not imagine that the most reckless semiotician has not been forced to the conclusion that he must eat to live: I do not believe that he approaches his bank in fear and trembling lest the meaning of the words on his cheque be challenged as inherently unreal by the cashier; nor even that the number of dollars concerned has ever been known to provoke paroxysms of interfacing hermeneutic hesitation. I also think it reasonable to believe that philosophy as a specialized social institution could not have begun if it had merely asserted the common assumptions about the reality of the outside world or the possibility of talking about it sensibly to our fellows; the first cheque to a philosopher must surely have gone to the sophist who proved that our material wants were unreal, or that the language we use had in fact no meaning, or at least one that was unsuspectedly problematic.
The whole enterprise of Western philosophy since the pre-Socratics, then, has largely depended on the paradoxical denial of what we all know to be in some simple sense true: and this essentially anti-realist view of things was given its decisive modern aesthetic formulation by Kant in The Critique ofJudgment (1790) when he decisively established the opposition of idealism and realism which is now evident in critical thought.
At the end of the nineteenth century the anti-realist position also became dominant in literature when symbolism and impressionism superseded realism and naturalism. The general critical outlook changed accordingly, and eventually spread to the academy at a time when philosophy was being replaced by literature as the queen of the sciences. Now, by a familiar dialectical reversal, what passes for philosophy has largely taken over the field of literary studies. In the last few decades this process has been materially assisted by the much greater self-confidence, prestige, and financial rewards of the natural, and to some extent of the social, sciences. This rivalry has led to an enormous compulsion to find an autonomous and quasiscientific methodology for the study of literature; and it is now widely assumed that some quasi-philosophical technique is an indispensable prerequisite for approaching or discussing any literary works.
The most extreme and influential form of this analytic technique is no doubt structuralism. It is concerned with timeless verities at a much deeper level than the particularities of individual literary works, and rejects as an exploded-or at any rate rather dull-relic of the past the notion that the referential functions of language, and therefore the representational status of literature, any longer merit the attentions of a sophisticated mind. As Roland Barthes put it in Le Degré zéro de l'écriture (1953), with engaging finality: the same habits of thought. The first prerequisite was an intellectual system which provided them an unchallengeable status as a sage; and at the same time that system had to be based on an approach to truth which 10 Quoted in Stern, p. 165. In his address Ian Watt translated this passage as follows: "Realism can only be, not the copy of things, but the knowledge of language; the most realist work will not be the one which 'paints' reality, but which, using the world as a content (a content which is, incidentally, a stranger to its [the work's] content, that is to say, to its being), makes the deepest possible explanation of the unreal reality of the language" [Ed.].
either disregarded or transcended all national, historical, and psychological differences, and took no notice of the fate which had befallen their own countries, or the various idiosyncrasies and hostilities which they encountered in their countries of adoption. After 1945, Paris offered them by far the most favourable institutional and intellectual environment, as to some extent it was for French intellectuals also. The humiliation of 1940 Vichy had made a reassertion of national greatness imperative; at the same time the very privileged status of the French higher bourgeoisie had survived almost intact. Indeed, it was soon expanded as far as the academic élites were concerned. For one thing, the needs of reconstruction led the government to set up a strong national research policy (Centre Nationale de Recherche Scientifique); and some humanists incidentally benefited from this-for example, Todorov. At the same time the strong centralizing policy of the French tradition continued, so that the top positions went to a relatively small group of those who came out well in the competitive examinations for the Grandes Ecoles. Even the new emphasis on business and technology was not wholly unfavourable in its effects because, although it ended the former alliance between the Ecole Normale and political power, the system enabled its beneficiaries to combine government positions with impeccable left-wing credentials: Althusser in the Ministry of Education, for instance.
The main structuralists operate at the very top of the Parisian academic hierarchy-Barthes and Foucault at the Collège de France, Todorov and Genette at the Ecole des Etudes Pratiques. They are almost entirely free from any obligatory educational ties or responsibilities. There is no teaching, or almost none-a dozen lectures on a chosen topic per year would be the norm; there is no responsibility for preparing students for examinations or administering a syllabus-that is done by the university proper, in so far as it is done; for the lectures there is no particular presumption that the students will have read any of the texts discussed-it would in fact be quite difficult for anyone to find out what they will be in advance.
The essence of the system is to promote brilliantly idiosyncratic verbalization without any fixed or controlling relation to anything outside the Cartesian ego as it thinks: it is all cogito and no cogitamus. The only real external constraints are those which they share with the Parisian high fashion industry. New structural designs are expected every winter as regularly as hemlines rise or fall in the dress salons, or new automobile models are produced in Detroit. This explains the annual books we have come to expect from the main structuralist writers, books that are more or less bound to express quite different opinions from the author's last because obsoles-cence is built into the game, and you only get on to the evening talk shows on French national television when you have done something new.
Philosophical Criticism and Literature
My satiric oversimplification is not, of course, intended to be whole truth, even of my own opinions; I have learned from some structuralists, am on friendly terms with some, and have even been translated for Poétique. But I am persuaded that structuralism exacerbates what I regard as a mistaken view of the nature of literary criticism, and am sure that it has disastrous effects as far as most teaching of literature is concerned. The most obvious error is the monstrous assumption that literary criticism, or the philosophy of the literary work, is inherently superior to literature itself, or if not that, at least an indispensable prerequisite for understanding it. The basic notion of the superior role of the critic, is, I suppose, essentially an attempt to retain in a new form the ancient claims of philosophy. But we don't need Blake or Kant or Matthew Arnold to tell us that what literature most characteristically offers is the concreteness of the imagined particular case, so that there is an essential difference between literary and philosophical discourse. The more the critic approaches the generality of philosophical statements the further he inevitably goes from the literature he is talking about. The view that we require a theoretical ontology of the literary work, or of the language, to understand literature seems to me equally mistaken.
It assumes that literature, like the Platonic forms, is not visible to the naked eye, and that we need special equipment to be able to see it. But unlike the mysteries of metaphysics, or indeed of faith or science, the literary work is really there, and needs only our own experience of life and language for us to be able to decipher its meaning. For reading literature, as Auerbach puts it, we need no more than our "empirical confidence in our spontaneous faculty for understanding others on the basis of our experience."11 Philosophical criticism has the practical effect of impeding the approach to literature in at least three ways. First, if the ordinary reader is persuaded that special analytic equipment is required, he may discover that he cannot sublunary mortal feel he must be blind to literature; and so he desists from further effort in despair of ever catching even a glimpse of the backside of the moon as the seers seem to do all the time. They belong, essentially, to the greatest lobby in America-the Anxiety Lobby-which ranges from armament manufacturers and Madison Avenue to Ralph Nader and some conservationists.
Last, philosophical criticism tends to view literature in exclusively cognitive terms. The result is that we are made to forget that it is a condition of literature's wider truth to life that it is not exclusively cognitive; that it covers the whole range of human actions and feelings, memories and imaginings; and to treat literature as cognitive both in subject and meaning is not only to misrepresent it, but to prevent it from fulfilling its capacity to enlarge our imaginative sympathies. That enlargement is surely one of the primary reasons for the place of literature in the educational curriculum: as Coleridge put it, "the imagination is the distinguishing characteristic of man as a progressive being."12
The opposition between theory and the direct imaginative experience of literature is particularly obvious in the case of structuralism. The enfants terribles of Paris, like those of other places, are in one respect inhuman: they are neither infants nor adults; and their brilliant command of an adult verbal apparatus either masks an absence of other kinds of understanding, or prevents it from appearing in their writing. Their talk is of deep universal structures; but these structures are produced by extravagant exclusions which defy human experience. In any case it is surely unhelpful, in an age when reading occurs less and less, and less and less naturally, to send out the message, not "Come on in, the water's fine," but "Beware the Baleful Binaries, The Dragons of the Deep"; and it doesn't help to map the whole world of literature with markers which turn out to announce the same binary monsters, especially when their names change every year.
One final objection. The actual educational effect of the currency of philosophical criticism is ultimately to hinder rather than to help the promotion of philosophical ways ofthought. For, quite apart from the appalling logical inadequacy of such writers as Lacan, the works of the structuralists are usually read second or third hand; a mass of textbooks offer do-ityourself kits which promise the user a magic transformation into being what he most wants-to be a philosopher without doing philosophy.
This macabre contemporary academic phenomenon was nicely taken off by the short-story writer Leonard Michaels, in a zany version of Swift: God only knows how many copies of Structuralist Poetics have been stolen. (The manager of this new store lost seventeen out of twenty, and now keeps Culler under the counter.) But how many copies have been stolen in university towns everywhere! How many philosophers curl up every night with a hot Culler! How many are ravished page after page by delicious analyses of critical theories which talk about nothing but other critical theories! (Would it be too much to say that theories which talk about theories are something like an extraordinary tumescence of the head?)
There is a story about a book thief in Cambridge who was caught stealing a
Culler. The police got a warrant, searched his apartment, and found sixty-three Cullers in his hope chest. All of them had been passionately underlined.13
Conclusion: "The Rise of the Novel" as Realist Criticism
You are no doubt wondering not only when I am going to finish, but whether I am going to do so by using The Rise of the Novel as an example of how philosophy should serve the purposes of literary study. The answer, I fear, is "yes"; but only in the spirit of a valedictory homily which is primarily intended to express my unchanged general views of the role of literary criticism.
My earlier account of youthful fraternizing with German thought will, I hope, acquit me of any boot-faced rejection of philosophy as such. I assume, of course, that as teachers and scholars we have an obligation to try to understand as much as we can of the world we live in, even if this sometimes turns out to mean an attempt to understand misunderstandings. But I cannot believe that we need put down all our assumptions in our writings, and I see no point in attempting a philosophical defence of the common uninstructed judgment that we all know sufficiently well what is real and what words mean and how they enable us to talk about matters of common interest. On some such grounds I see The Rise of the Novel as being a realist work of criticism; and this, I suppose, is connected with four aspects of the book which may be worth commenting on: the attitude to philosophy; the attitude to language; the attitude to the reader; and the attitude to the subject. Philosophically, realism is generally assumed to regard deductive reasoning as a less reliable guide to truth than common experience. This no doubt informs my avoidance of most methodological issues. I assume that philosophy can help the critic in at least three ways: by giving him a sense of how different kinds of problems can be approached; by giving him a sense of conceptual consistency and of the appropriate degree of logic in exposition; and finally, by giving him a notion of the interrelatedness of different bodies of knowledge, the attempt, in Robert Louis
Stevenson's phrase, to "circumnavigate the metaphysics," can inform our whole way of seeing a subject. In the course of looking at some early reviews I was interested to see that Irving Howe had written of my method in The Rise of the Novel: "the various critical schools of the past few decades ... come into play ... as elements that have been assimilated by the critic's sensibility ... for example ... the insights borrowed from Marx become his own possession, inseparable from his awareness as a whole."14 One is always immensely grateful to critics who help one to make sense of what one has been trying to do. Irving Howe's notion of the Gestalt of awareness perfectly expresses what I intuitively felt then, and see more clearly now, to the primary value of philosophy in enriching literary criticism; and that value, I am convinced, directly depends upon the capacity ofthe ideas concerned to promote our understanding of literary, aesthetic, and historical experience.
The question of the appropriate linguistic decorum of literary criticism is closely tied to this. It should not assume that philosophical terminology has any superiority of status. Of course, all more or less specialized pursuits have their own vocabularies-plumbers make a nice distinction between a coupling and a union-but the vocabulary of criticism should be as common-sense as possible in its attempt to achieve clarity and accessibility of statement. It should also avoid unnecessary abstraction as a courtesy to the reader, and to the subject. I remember one conversation with Theodor Adorno when, after I'd said what I'd done that morning (checking out some books from the library, going to the laundromat, etc.), and asked "What about you," I was slightly chilled when he answered: "I have been meditating on erotic and musicological problems."
The effect of long words is a little like that which Fowler attributes to the exact pronunciation of French words in English conversation: "the greater its success as a tour de force, the greater its failure as a step in the conversational progress; for your collocutor, aware that he could not have done it himself, has his attention distracted whether he admires or is humiliated."15 Any literary criticism whose effect is to humiliate the reader (and I've seen some cases where that seemed its only intention) seems to me to defeat its primary purpose, which is, I take it, to be part of a conversation among lovers of literature. In that sense, the critic's concern for a common orientation with his reader towards literature should produce a style of discourse which is fraternal; that is, discourse whose rhetoric implies the common and equal possession of shared interests and feelings. I treasure a few letters and chance enounters, incidentally, which have indicated that my intentions in this respect did not go unregarded by some readers of The Rise of the Novel.
Wittgenstein once said that he didn't dine at high table because "the conversation was neither from the heart nor from the head." How the heart can be represented in critical writing is a very delicate matter; but there should surely be some evidence that the writer's experience of literature
